


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February 8, 1960

**Memorandum For: The Honorable Lyndon Johnson, Chairman
Committee on Aeronautical and Space Sciences, and
Preparedness Investigating Subcommittee of the
Committee on Armed Services
United States Senate**

**Subject: Return of Transcript, Testimony of
Allen W. Dulles, 29 January 1960**

Enclosed herewith is the corrected copy of the transcript of my testimony before your Committee on 29 January 1960. There are also enclosed page-size copies of the charts used in conjunction with the briefing.

It should be noted that the chart entitled "Comparative ICBM Estimates" is intended only to summarize the relationship between the January 1960 intelligence estimate and the December 1958 estimate which formed the basis for the CIA presentation to the Committee a year ago. As indicated in the testimony of 29 January, the two estimates are not fully comparable.

The 1958 estimate examined Soviet capacity to reach an "operational capability" with 500 ICBMs. The figure 500 was selected arbitrarily. The term "operational capability" was the equivalent of the term "operational inventory" used in the 1960 estimate.

Our findings in the 1958 estimate were that the USSR could probably reach this arbitrary number of 500 ICBMs three years after establishing initial operational capability (IOC); and that they could possibly reach the same figure two years after IOC.* The two-year span assumed over-riding priority -- a "crash" program, in effect. The estimate also identified the point at which 100 missiles could be deployed under the three and the two year build up; these dates were one and one-half years and one year, respectively, after IOC.

*See Annex for last year's testimony before the Committee on this point.

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Evidence acquired subsequent to the 1958 estimate convinced us that a "crash" program was not involved. This conclusion was reached in an interim estimate of September 8, 1959, and confirmed in the 1960 estimate. Hence, figures on a crash basis were eliminated from the chart, but reference was made by footnote and in my testimony to this feature of the 1958 estimate.

In order to give a year-by-year comparison, for mid-years 1960, 1961 and 1962, it was necessary to interpolate figures which did not appear in the 1958 estimate. The interpolated figures are shown in brackets on the chart; as pointed out, the 1958 estimate focused on the time to acquire 100 and 500 missiles.

The chart shown your Committee also gave "on launcher" figures associated with the 1958 estimate. That estimate contained no explicit percentage or figures for missiles "on launcher." Our intelligence analysts were then using an assumption that 50 per cent of the operational inventory would be on launcher; the chart reflected this background assumption. This year's figures, as the chart shows, assume that the number of missiles on launchers would be between 70 per cent and 80 per cent of the operational inventory. Had we used the 70 to 80 per cent "on launcher" percentages made explicit in our 1960 estimate, the "on launcher" figures shown on the chart for the 1958 estimate would, of course, have been larger.

The chart was a briefing aid to supplement the testimony given on 29 January, when many of the figures were explained in greater detail, and should be considered in conjunction with the record of that testimony and with this letter.

Allen W. Dulles
Director

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